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Abstract: The launch of the ‘Energy Union’ in 2014, represented a major step to deepen EU 
cooperation in energy and climate policies. Yet, in energy, member states have remained 
particularly jealous of their sovereignty, limiting the pace and scope of integration. EU energy 
policy appears to fit the specifications of ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (NI). Member states have 
been keen on reinforcing cooperation in the area but have refrained from delegating further 
authority to supranational institutions, preferring to maintain a high level of control within the 
Council and European Council. However, focusing on the Energy Union Governance 
Regulation adopted in 2018, we argue that the sector does not fit neatly within this NI account. 
Although governments remain central to the process, they operate within a hybrid institutional 
framework combining supranational and intergovernmental elements, in which formal and 
informal authority distribution is unstable and contested. We suggest that this form of 
governance is better described as ‘embedded intergovernmentalism’. 
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In the past decade and a half, energy policy has moved from a marginal position to a prominent 
and dynamic area of European integration. Energy issues have been increasingly harnessed to 
climate policy and have become particularly salient internationally within the context of 
international climate negotiations and the urgency of an energy transition to meet Paris 
Agreement commitments. In Europe energy policy is also perceived as an area with the 
potential to reinvigorate the integration process and demonstrate the ‘added value’ of the EU 
to its member states and citizens (e.g. Andoura et al. 2010). The ‘Energy Union’, launched by 
the European Commission in 2014, is a high-profile initiative to deepen cooperation in this 
area.  
 
Since its inception, EU energy policy has developed without a clearly delineated legal 
foundation. It has emerged out of the EU’s competencies in contiguous policy areas - 
particularly the internal market and environmental provisions (Morata and Solorio 2012). This 
has meant an important role for the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU). On the other hand, member states have remained particularly guarded when it comes 
to their sovereignty in this area, limiting the pace and scope of integration (Slominski 2016, 
345). Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has formal competencies in 
energy. Community competencies now explicitly encompass the internal energy market, as 
well as clean energy and the security of energy supplies. Yet legal authority remains firmly 
with member states in significant areas such as national resources, the ability to determine 
national energy mixes, as well as taxation. Member state governments have also been at the 
centre of the decision-making process, within the Council and increasingly through the 
European Council which has significant authority to decide key energy issues such as climate 
and energy targets. On this account, EU energy policy appears to fit the specifications of the 
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so-called ‘new intergovernmentalism’ post-Maastricht, which sees member states as keen on 
reinforcing cooperation in sovereignty sensitive areas while refraining from delegating further 
powers to supranational authorities.  
 
This paper examines the EU’s Energy Union governance framework to answer two related 
questions: 1. Does the evolution of EU energy governance as part of the ‘Energy Union’ project 
continue or depart from pre-existing patterns of authority distribution? 2. Does the new EU 
energy and climate governance framework fit the new intergovernmentalist model of authority 
distribution? We examine how the key actors involved approach the distribution of authority 
between member states and EU institutions, and what the negotiations and their outcome tell 
us about where authority lies in energy policy, how this distribution is contested, and how 
contestation is managed in the sector.  
 
We argue that different legal bases and roles for supranational institutions mean that the 
boundaries of energy policy are unclear, increasingly overlapping with climate policy, and the 
distribution of authority is unstable and contested. It is a hybrid area combining 
intergovernmental and Community modes of governance. Although member states exercise 
significant authority through the Council and increasingly the European Council, this takes 
place within the context of the EU’s institutional environment.  
 
The first section reviews critically the new intergovernmentalist agenda, discusses the limits of 
its application to EU energy policy, and contrasts three governance models – new 
intergovernmentalism, the Community method and a third hybrid model we call ‘embedded 
intergovernmentalism’ – focusing on three dimensions – decision-making and decisions; the 
role of supranational institutions  (notably in implementation); and compliance mechanisms. 
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This framework is then applied to Energy Union governance, contrasting it with the pre-
existing governance framework to identify and characterise shifting patterns of authority. We 
focus in particular on the 2018 Energy Union Governance Regulation, a central piece of the 
2030 clean energy governance framework. The following section reflects on patterns of 
authority distribution in the Energy Union and best ways to conceptualise energy policy 
governance. We conclude that a better way to understand EU energy policy integration is to 
conceptualise it as a form of ‘embedded intergovernmentalism’, in which governments remain 
central and particularly jealous of national prerogatives, while being deeply entrenched in the 
EU institutional framework.   
 
 
The Community method, new intergovernmentalism or embedded 
intergovernmentalism? 
 
The ‘new intergovernmentalism’ debate  
The new intergovernmentalism (NI) that has emerged after the Maastricht Treaty is 
characterised by ‘integration without supranationalism’ (Bickerton et al. 2015a, 703; 2015b). 
Member states have shown an appetite for enhanced cooperation while being simultaneously 
reluctant to delegate further sovereignty and bring sensitive areas within the realm of the 
traditional Community method of EU decision-making. This has been most evident in the new 
areas of integration that have developed after Maastricht, namely common foreign and security 
policy, economic and monetary union, as well as parts of justice and home affairs and social 
and employment policies. Here governments have privileged the search for consensus through 
intergovernmental fora as well as the delegation of powers to ‘de novo bodies’, rather than to 
supranational institutions (Bickerton et al. 2015). It is not clear, however, whether NI is meant 
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to characterise only the so-called ‘new’ areas of integration or the European project as a whole, 
including the former first pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. As Bulmer argues (2015, 294), NI 
rightly points to an intergovernmental tendency in European integration, but integration post-
Maastricht also includes moves towards supranationalisation in certain areas. 
 
Integration without supranationalism is attributed to changes in the political economy of 
member states since the 1980s with the end of the post-war Keynesian consensus, as well as 
change in state-society relations and increasing tensions between elites and citizens over 
integration (Bickerton 2012). Indeed, the growth of domestic contestation has created a form 
‘constraining dissensus’ that limits the possibilities of functional integration (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009), to which intergovernmental cooperation is a response, redirecting rather than 
redressing legitimacy problems (Hodson and Puetter 2019). 
 
NI is also associated with a micro theory of institutional change that Puetter (2012, 2014) has 
labelled ‘deliberative intergovernmentalism’. In sensitive areas, national government are eager 
to seek commonly agreed solutions while remaining anxious of being by-passed and adamant 
about preserving their veto rights. This translates into the preference for consensus, which 
intergovernmental institutions such as the Council, European Council and Eurogroup are 
geared towards producing. This consensus is engineered through specific institutional features 
(such as more regular meetings, informality, secrecy) which aim to favour ‘honest’ 
deliberation, problem solving and cooperation (Maricut and Puetter, 2017). NI emphasises and 
explains consensus-seeking between European governments but, as a result, tends to overlook 
enduring divisions and conflict (Schimmelfennig 2015, 728) and ‘largely disregard[s] the 
significance of coercive or institutional power’ (Schmidt 2018, 1546). As Novak (2013) 
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contends, consensus can also be ‘apparent’ rather than actual, as deliberation can hide latent 
conflict and power relations. 
 
Energy as a new intergovernmental area?  
Energy is an area in which national traditions and prerogatives are deeply rooted. Member 
states’ approaches and preferences to a large extent reflect their national resources, energy 
mixes and the structures of their national energy systems, as well as their political histories. 
Energy policies are still perceived as key to national sovereignty and even national security 
(Judge and Maltby 2017), and national governments are reluctant to cede authority to the 
supranational level on issues that have direct and important consequences for their citizens’ 
welfare.  
 
As a result, the upward delegation of authority to the EU level and supranational institutions 
has been limited and belated. At the beginning of the 1990s the energy sector was one of the 
least integrated sectors in the European Communities (Matlary 1996). However, since the mid-
1990s, despite the lack of firm legal basis, energy policy cooperation has deepened within the 
framework of the traditional Community method, with the Commission as (formally) the sole 
initiator of legislation, the European Parliament (EP) as co-legislator and a role for the Court 
in adjudicating disputes and enforcement (see Dehousse 2011). The energy sector was included 
in the internal market agenda in the late 1990s (Eising 2002) and affected by the growing body 
of environmental legislation via the EU’s wide-ranging competences in that area (Morata and 
Solorio 2012). The Commission has been instrumental in using its legal prerogatives in other 
sectors, in particular the internal market (including competition rules) to push integration 
forward in energy (Schmidt 1998). These developments were eventually codified in the Lisbon 
Treaty (art. 194) and expanded to security of supply measures, the Treaty explicitly specifying 
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that national resources, the energy mix and taxation remain strictly national prerogatives - a 
reflection of member states’ enduring sovereignty concerns. However, the importance of article 
194 should not be overstated as it has simply institutionalised what had developed 
progressively in practice (Piris 2010, 319).  
 
Decision-making and decisions 
Energy negotiations have been highly contested and member states have been at the forefront 
both individually and collectively (e.g. Buchan 2009). The European Council has gained 
influence due to the need for inter-sector coordination at the highest level to set mid- to long-
term energy and climate objectives (such as the 2020 and 2030 targets) and national political 
authority to respond to energy crises. Thaler (2016) stresses the role of the European Council 
in energy policy development, as central to facilitating integration through ironing out 
dissensus. On this account, energy policy shares certain characteristics with the ‘new areas’ of 
intergovernmental cooperation identified by new intergovernmentalism. Member states have 
been keen on reinforcing cooperation in the area, while at the same time refraining from 
delegating authority to supranational institutions, preferring to maintain national sovereignty 
over key aspects. Intergovernmental fora, where consensus nominally prevails, have been 
central to this process. 
 
However, Thaler’s account overstates the European Council’s capacity to steer the policy-
making process and monitor implementation. The European Council meets relatively 
infrequently (usually quarterly) and discusses energy and climate policy only occasionally 
within these meetings. Its attention to these issues tends to peak after energy crises (e.g. the 
2009 gas supply disruption) or in preparation for international climate conferences (e.g. 2007-
8, 2013-4) (Alexandrova 2015).  A new intergovernmentalist perspective also underplays that 
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intergovernmental bargaining takes place within the parameters of a supranational framework 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, 299-300), which shapes its process and outcomes. In hybrid 
areas such as energy, we argue that there is a more systematic interplay between 
intergovernmental and legislative processes, with the former remaining central but embedded 
in the latter. 
 
Role of supranational institutions 
NI claims that post-Maastricht the Commission refrains from pursuing further integration as it 
is sensitive to member states’ concerns (e.g. Hodson 2013), underlining the importance of 
ownership by member states through consensual decision-making at the top level to ensure the 
authority of the decisions and ensure smooth implementation and compliance (Puetter 2012). 
Yet, this perspective misses the influence of supranational institutions based on their legislative 
prerogatives and ability to influence intergovernmental debates. In hybrid governance areas 
such as energy, European Council conclusions do set the framework within which the 
legislators must work, but the European Commission plays a substantial role in framing policy 
debates and following up with legislative proposals (Bocquillon and Dobbels 2014), and 
implementation including the possibility of infringement proceedings if member states fail to 
comply. Its formal and informal agenda setting powers – exclusive right of legislative initiative, 
decision on the timing of proposals – provides the Commission with the ability to steer the 
process and shape outcomes. The European Parliament has been progressively empowered as 
a co-legislator in most areas of energy policy, acquiring institutional power in the decision-
making process both in agenda setting and in co-decision by putting pressure on the Council 
but also through ideational influence and discursive interactions - in link with a ‘new 





In areas dominated by NI, key decisions tend to be first and foremost of a political nature – 
often in the form of European Council conclusions and intergovernmental agreements, even 
though legislation is not absent. In comparison, in areas subject to the traditional Community 
method, implementation and compliance are ensured through legislative and judicial means. In 
sectors characterised by hybrid governance objectives are often non- (or partially) binding and 
the obligation falling on member states general in scope. Compliance mechanisms here tend to 
incorporate a process of reporting by governments, monitoring of progress by the Commission, 
combined with peer-pressure for those governments who are lagging behind. Given the EU’s 
circumscribed but significant legal competence, there is a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Eberlein 
2008). This takes the form of court sanctions or the potential of issuing ‘harder’, more 
constraining, legislation to help steer the implementation process and ensure compliance. 
Intergovernmental and supranational modes of governance are therefore intertwined, and in 
interaction with each other. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Case and methods 
 
We look at the validity of NI claims and propose an ‘embedded intergovernmentalist’ approach 
for the case of the Energy Union governance framework. In this section we briefly present the 
contextual background to the case and methodology used, before presenting the empirical 
material and analysis. 
 




In April 2014 the Polish Prime Minister proposed an ‘Energy Union’, focused on supply 
security objectives, including a joint gas purchase mechanism to strengthen the hand of EU 
member states vis à vis external suppliers (Szulecki et al. 2016). The new Commission 
President Juncker seized on the Energy Union project as a priority in Autumn 2014 and created 
the post of Energy Union Vice President to drive it forward.   
 
In preparation for the Paris Climate summit of December 2015, the Autumn 2014 European 
Council conclusions set out the 2030 climate and energy policy framework, including its three 
main targets: 27% energy efficiency (see Dupont 2020), 27% renewables and a 40% GHG 
emission reduction. It was agreed that: “…a reliable and transparent governance system 
without any unnecessary administrative burden will be developed to help ensure that the EU 
meets its energy policy goals” (European Council 2014, 9). As the proposed 2030 energy 
efficiency goal was non-binding and the renewable energy target was binding only at EU level, 
a governance mechanism was promoted - in particular by Germany, along with France and 
Scandinavian countries - to ensure a collective effort by member state (Vandendriessche et al. 
2017, 18). 
 
The Commission’s 2015 Energy Union strategy included five broad priority areas.1 The initial 
breadth, or vagueness, of the concept made it hard to oppose for member states and  industry 
stakeholders, particularly when there was support from the public for energy integration 
(interview 3), and it was endorsed by the European Council the following month (European 
Council 2015). The Commission’s strategy emphasised the requirement for “an integrated 
 
1 Security, solidarity and trust; a fully integrated energy market; energy efficiency; decarbonisation; and research, 
innovation and competitiveness. 
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governance and monitoring process” (Commission 2015, 17). A Regulation on Governance of 
the Energy Union was formally proposed as part of the November 2016 ‘Clean Energy 
package’, composed of eight pieces of legislation, the other seven of which were revisions to 
existing directives and regulations.  
 
The 2015 Paris climate negotiations saw the EU join the High Ambition Coalition, which 
pushed for limiting emissions to levels compatible with a 1.5°C global temperature increase 
(going further than the established 2°C target). Adopted in December 2015, the Paris 
Agreement includes the aspirational 1.5°C target and proposes a bottom-up process through 
which the parties define their own plans towards achieving the overall objective through 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which should be reviewed and upgraded at 
regular intervals. The EU’s commitment to the Paris Agreement has shaped its own governance 
mechanism (Oberthür 2019). 
 
The Governance Regulation “aims to integrate, simplify and align an overlapping set of 
planning, reporting and monitoring requirements (‘obligations’) under the existing EU energy 
and climate acquis” (Wilson 2018, 2; also Ringel and Knodt 2018), after the Commission 
concluded that there was a lack of policy coherence, efficiency and consistency between 
climate and energy policy fields (Commission 2016). The aim is also to provide a robust 
process to monitor implementation and ensure that member states are on track to achieve EU 
headline goals and Paris Agreement commitments.  
 
Methodology 
The research takes a qualitative approach, using rich primary data to analyse authority conflicts 
and compromises regarding the Energy Union governance architecture. We focus in particular 
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on the EU’s 2018 Regulation on Governance of the Energy Union, and interconnected 
legislation proposed as part of the winter 2016 ‘Clean Energy Package’. The governance 
structure is discussed in comparison to pre-existing governance frameworks, in particular those 
established as part of the European Climate Change Programme in the early 2000s, and the 
2009 climate and energy package. The qualitative approach includes the use of documentary 
evidence, press releases and eighteen elite interviews with representatives of the member states, 
the European Commission and Parliament, the Council Secretariat, energy regulators and 
industry representatives, and energy experts working in the media, think tanks and NGOs. They 
were selected based on their centrality in the EU-based energy policy network and the Clean 
Energy Package’s policy-making process.   
 
Negotiating the Energy Union governance framework 
 
The empirical analysis is divided into three sections, as identified in our discussion of NI as 
applied to energy, and the theoretical framework: decision-making, the role of supranational 
institutions, and compliance mechanisms. 
 
Decision-making: Setting the EU’s climate ambition 
A key debate within the Clean Energy Package centred around the level and legally binding 
nature of the EU’s climate ambition in the context of the Paris Agreement. In October 2014 the 
European Council, based on a Commission proposal, increased the 2020 targets of 20-20-20 
(emissions reduction, renewables, energy efficiency improvements) to 40-27-27 by 2030. 
While as part of the 2020 Framework both the GHG and renewable targets were binding at the 
national level, in the 2030 Framework it is the case only for the GHG target.2 Influenced by 
 
2 The EU wide binding GHG targets rests on binding national targets in sectors not covered by the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme (ETS) as part of the Effort Sharing Regulation, and obligations which are binding on companies 
in the sectors covered by the ETS. 
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Energy Commissioner Oettinger, the Commission refrained from pushing for binding national 
commitments for renewable energy and energy efficiency (Bürgin 2015). It was criticised for 
failing to take an ambitious stance against reluctant member states, with the UK supported by 
Spain, Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries rejecting binding renewable 
targets as an infringement of their authority to decide their own energy mix (Nelsen 2014; 
interview 7). The level of ambition was generally considered disappointing for renewable 
energy and energy efficiency (van Renssen 2014). As assumed by NI, the Commission avoided 
more integrationist measures, while the European Council played a central role in defining the 
framework which the Commission had to work within when devising its clean energy package.  
 
In 2017, the debate about climate ambition re-emerged, in a context where the EU wanted to 
demonstrate its ambition as part of the implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement, while 
climate issues had also risen in the agenda of several member states. It exposed a power 
struggle between member states themselves, as well as with supranational institutions. During 
the negotiations in the Council, Germany and France worked closely together (interview 16), 
while Luxemburg, Portugal, The Netherlands and Sweden were part of the most ambitious 
coalition (interviews 8, 13, 17). The negotiation dynamics changed over time. Following 
elections in 2017, the German government ceased coordinating with ambitious states 
(interview 8).3 Instead, France was now demonstrating climate leadership under its newly 
elected President and high-profile environment Minister Nicolas Hulot, along with Sweden and 
Luxembourg (interview 6). The increase in EU target ambitions was significantly aided by 
changes in governments in Spain and Italy as negotiations neared an end. With Spain, this new 
ambition on climate and energy was espoused by the new socialist energy minister - leading a 
 
3 In June 2018, the German Economy and Energy minister effectively vetoed any higher ambition than 32% for 
renewables, setting an upper limit in negotiations (Simon, 2018b). 
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newly created Ministry for Ecological Transition (interviews 8; 11; 13; 15). The change in 
Italy’s position, a result of the new Lega-Five Star Movement coalition government and driven 
mainly by the Five Star Movement’s environmental commitments, was surprising, “swinging 
the balance in favour of higher ambition” (interviews 8, 17). It led to the unravelling of a 
potential blocking minority at the June energy council, in the late stages of the trilogue with 
the European Parliament (interview 15). Whilst the Visegrad Group were opposed to ambitious 
renewable targets (interview 8) and a shift of authority to the EU level in this area (interview 
12), Poland’s likely opposition was constrained by hosting the UN’s 2018 climate change 
conference (interview 15), and “Bulgaria was neutralised by being the President” during the 
negotiations (interview 15). On Energy Efficiency there was similarly no blocking minority as 
the target was strictly non-binding. During the negotiations, authority delegation was therefore 
contested. Member states were not united in their preferences for the role of supranational 
institutions as assumed by NI, their positions shaped by changing national and international 
contexts. 
 
It was within this context that the EP was able to influence the level of ambition. The Parliament 
was decisive in shifting ambitions upwards (interviews 8, 12, 16, 17, 18), seeking a 35% 
renewable target by 2030 instead of the original 27% (EP 2018), and a 40% instead of 27% 
target for energy efficiency. At the end of the negotiations, the Council and EP agreed on a 
compromise of increasing ambition to 32% for renewables and 32.5% for energy efficiency. 
On the nature of the targets, the EP was less successful, accepting that the renewable target 
would remain binding at EU level only and that the energy efficiency target was kept non-
binding as preferred by member states. Therefore, the Council, while shifting its position on 




Another related and contested issue was the trajectory to be followed to reach the renewable 
energy targets. While the Commission had proposed a first check of national and EU progress 
towards these EU goals in 2023, member states agreed with the EP’s proposal to have an earlier 
first check on progress, in 2022, but successfully countered that there should only be three (not 
four) reference points - to avoid administrative burden and inefficiency. Member states also 
pushed for an exponential rather than linear trajectory – as proposed by the Commission – 
towards nationally ‘planned contributions’. Such an ‘improvement focused approach’ would 
require greater efforts close to 2030 to reduce costs by waiting for technology improvements 
(interview 1). Eventually a compromise agreement was adopted, which saw the Council and 
EP meet in the middle.4  
 
In the context of the Paris Agreement, the EP has also pushed for the EU to commit to net zero 
emissions by 2050 (EP 2018).5 Member states were divided; with France, Sweden and 
Luxembourg pushing for the net zero target but others opposed (Simon 2018a). The Council 
agreed only that plans should be consistent with the Paris Agreement (CoEU 2018), however 
the European Council in March 2018 requested the Commission to prepare a long-term Paris-
compliant climate strategy to be drafted in 2019 and finalised in 2020 (European Council 
2018).6 This aligns EP and ambitious member state preferences, and the delegated authority 
permits the Commission to then strongly influence member states’ climate ambition by framing 
it in terms of their Paris Agreement commitments. 
 
 
4 The Council proposal (2022-16%, 2025-40%, 2027-60%) compared to the EP proposal (2022-20%, 2025-45%, 
2027-70%) (CoEU 2018). 18, 43 and 65 was eventually agreed (EP and CoEU, 2018a, art. 4.2).  
5 The EP proposed that long-term emission strategies should run to 2100, and crucially that by 2050 they should 
show zero emissions, with negative emissions after (EP 2018). 
6 The net zero commitment was eventually endorsed by the European Council at its 12 December 2019 summit, 
although at the price of constructive ambiguity: the conclusions state that ‘one member state [Poland], at this 
stage, cannot commit to implement this objective’ (European Council 2019, 1). 
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The role of supranational institutions: Planning and reporting 
In the 2020 governance framework, EU and national targets were defined as part of different 
pieces of legislation (for more details on the 2020 renewable energy and energy efficiency 
targets see respectively: Solorio & Jörgens 2020; and Dupont 2020). Member states had to 
establish separate plans for renewables, energy efficiency or non-ETS sector emissions, 
presenting the measures to be adopted to reach their sectoral objectives. In the new governance 
framework planning and reporting obligations are consolidated into integrated ‘National 
Energy and Climate Plans’ (NECPs). Member states define their national renewable and energy 
efficiency contributions towards EU targets as part of NECPs, in a bottom-up fashion on the 
model of the Paris Climate agreement. This approach partially confirms NI’s hypotheses about 
the dominance of national sovereignty concerns and preference for enhanced 
intergovernmental cooperation. In contrast, to achieve the EU’s GHG emission target, the 
NECPs only specify the measures through which the national emission targets in non-ETS 
sectors will be implemented and achieved, whilst national contributions are still determined at 
EU level by the Effort Sharing Regulation (EP and CoEU, 2018a, Annex I). 
 
However, even for renewables and energy efficiency, aspects of the target setting process 
suggest that it is not strictly bottom-up. The plans, whose framework is outlined in Annex 1 of 
the regulation, are based on templates produced by the Commission.7 The EP successfully 
pushed for a transparent process for producing national plans (EP 2018), through their 
publication and public consultations involving national parliaments, local and regional 
authorities, as well as civil society (EP and CoEU, 2018b, art. 10 & 11). They will be produced 
in a structured, transparent, iterative process between the Commission and Member States (EP 
 
7 While the Commission proposed that these templates shall (mandatory) be used, it was eventually watered down 
to should (advisory) (EP and CoEU 2018b). 
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and CoEU, 2018b, article 1). Whilst member states supported intermittent reports on their 
national climate and energy plans, the EP wanted regular and more comprehensive reporting 
(interviews 7 and 8). The negotiated outcome was a close oversight role for the Commission 
in the creation of national plans, with a role in reviewing biennial progress reports on their 
implementation from 2021, to facilitate EU level aggregation and assessment (EP and CoEU, 
2018b, article 17). Whilst framed as ‘Better Regulation’, with streamlined and minimised 
reporting obligations (interview 5), a number of member states perceive that their preferences 
have been overruled and that: a) the information reporting obligations are the same or have 
increased (interview 13); and b) that these obligations grant considerable authority to the 
Commission to monitor member state policy planning and implementation, and to interpret its 
role (interviews 7, 9, 11, 13, 16):  
“[I]t is not a renationalisation of energy policy, totally the contrary. New governance is what 
the Commission wants. It is high on the agenda now, and it could continue to be so – and 
be political. Or it could be low on the agenda and technical… There is an option to really 
put pressure on national politics and national ministries. There is total discretion legally” 
(interview 14).  
The Commission’s first review of draft NECPs at the end of 2018  found that whilst one third 
of member states were judged to have submitted (sufficiently) ambitious contributions to the 
EU’s renewable energy target, there was an overall gap in ambition. As a result, the 
Commission recommended several member states ‘reconsider their level of ambition’ ahead of 
final submissions, “increasing national contributions as appropriate” (Commission 2019, 3). 
The same Commission review finds a “substantial gap” for energy efficiency, with only a few 
member states proposing “a sufficient level of contributions for 2030” (Commission 2019, 4), 
and that “all Member States whose contributions are assessed as not sufficient at this stage are 
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recommended to review them and consider increasing the level of ambition” (Commission 
2019, 5). 
In 2023, the Commission will review progress towards the headline 2030 EU targets and 
achieving its commitments as part of the Paris Agreement (EP and CoEU, 2018a, art. 14). It 
will assess if there is an ‘ambition gap’ and/or an ‘implementation gap’. This review date is 
considered “an open door to go higher” (interview 12), and “has the explicit mention that the 
targets can only be reviewed upwards, so it is a kind of ratcheting-up principle” (interview 15). 
This refers to the clause in both the amended energy efficiency and recast renewable energy 
Directives (EP and CoEU 2018c/d, article 3).  
 
Compliance mechanisms: Peer review and the shadow of the Community method 
Without binding national targets for renewables and energy efficiency, there is a more limited 
threat of infringement proceedings from the CJEU. Member states are only obliged: to create 
national integrated climate and energy plans, and where relevant to respond to Commission 
recommendations issued on renewables (and possibly other Energy Union objectives) when 
the EU is collectively adjudged to be failing without any strict obligation to implement them; 
and to address implementation gaps, choosing the appropriate instruments and measures (EP 
and CoEU, 2018b, article 31). The Commission can initiate infringement proceedings for 
incorrect or partial implementation (for instance incomplete national plans), delays, or failure 
to attempt to address the implementation gap, but not for failure to actually achieve renewable 
and energy efficiency targets. However, the Governance Regulation provides the Commission 
with more power to consult with member states on plans (interview 8), and to monitor them.  
 
Peer pressure is often identified as a central tool to ensure ambition and compliance. Greater 
transparency will allow civil society organisations at the EU and national levels to track 
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progress and identify ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ (interview 10). The binding template is 
considered a: “…tool to shape the political process through obligation of member states to 
make transparent their contributions and underlying assumptions” (interview 9; also interview 
16). The EP strongly advocated increased transparency in the governance mechanism to 
compensate for relatively soft governance as it “creates a different level of pressure” (interview 
10; also 15). In addition, the EP proposed the inclusion of a formula for the calculation of 
indicative national renewable contributions, which was supported by the most ambitious 
member states (interviews 7, 11, 16) and included in the final legislation (EP and CoEU, 2018b, 
Annex II).8 This formula does not mean a return to binding targets but sets expectations. In the 
words of an energy official in the Commission: “…the formula is an assessment tool, it is 
informal, we will use it if there is a gap. We already tell them [MS] what the minimum 
requirements are” (interview 10). In fact, in its recommendations of June 2019 on the draft 
NECPs, the Commission has not shied from using the formula to recommend more ambition 
on renewable energy from 12 states (Euractiv, 2019). 
 
In theory, member states will want to avoid being in the group of countries who are considered 
as not being ambitious enough and asked to do more (interview 16). This is a key aspect of the 
regulation: “at the core is soft power. Naming and shaming” (interview 12). Member states 
themselves will be able to monitor each other’s efforts towards the common objectives. As a 
senior Commission official summarised: “Deadlines, dialogue, benchmarking, tracking, 
monitoring are the key components [providing] teeth” to ensure compliance and to steer an 
upwards dynamic in terms of implementation and ambition (interview 2; also 5, 6, 9).  
 
 
8 Germany, Spain and Sweden were amongst the member states pushing for a binding formula initially, though 
this was abandoned in 2014 (interviews 11 and 16). 
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A State of the Energy Union report will continue to be produced, now on an annual rather than 
biannual/ad hoc basis (EP and CoEU, 2018b, art. 35). If the EU is not on target to meet its 
goals, then the Commission will make non-binding recommendations.9 Whilst the target for 
renewables is binding only at the EU level, member states are obliged to set out a ‘mandatory 
baseline share’ and national indicative trajectory from 2021 to 2030. This is a bottom-up 
mechanism of setting targets, but if renewables are below this then the Commission will ask 
for additional measures from Member States, who should then close this gap. Yet, due to 
national sensitivities, if the national gap is not closed the Commission is clear that it does not 
intend to use the reporting and monitoring system to design a system that is “binding by the 
back door” (interview 2). Still, member states are obliged to take ‘due account’ of these 
recommendations and also provide and make public reasons for not addressing them ‘in a spirit 
of solidarity between Member States and the Union and between Member States’ (EP and 
CoEU 2018b, article 34).10 Ultimately, the recommendations are considered ‘political’: “It is 
peer pressure. Member states will expose themselves to their peers if they don’t do their part” 
(interview 10; also interview 11).  
 
Beyond reporting, monitoring and peer pressure the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is retained. Some 
parts of related legislation are legally binding, such as sub-targets and objectives enshrined in 
the Energy Performance in Buildings Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive or eco-design 
directives (Dupont 2020). These provisions could be legally enforced to help close the 
implementation gap. Moreover, if a delivery gap emerges at the EU rather than national level, 
the regulation explicitly states that it “shall propose measures and exercise its powers at Union 
level in order to ensure the collective achievement of those objectives and targets” (EP and 
 
9 Sweden and Luxembourg were amongst the minority willing to have binding recommendations (interview 8). 
10 This was weakened from the Commission’s position of wanting member states to ‘take utmost account’ of these 
(Commission 2016).  
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CoEU 2018a, article 31). National measures should be prioritised but amending related EU 
legislation (on renewable energy, energy efficiency, or ecodesign for instance) to strengthen 
the targets, obligations and monitoring process remain on the table, creating an additional 
pressure for laggards to comply (interviews 11, 15 and 16). This option would require the 
agreement of the co-legislators and would therefore necessitate a shift in the position of key 
member states, but is potentially achievable if the Governance Regulation proves to be too 
weak to meet the Council’s stated ambitions in a context where decarbonisation has risen up 
the national and EU agendas, and the Commission is tasked with proposing alternatives. 
 
Discussion  
Institutional power balance: authority contestation and institutional compromise 
As part of flagship Energy Union project, the case of the Governance Regulation reveals the 
ongoing authority contestation between member states and supranational institutions. Early on, 
member states took a strong stance to preserve their guarded sovereignty in defining their 
energy mix and policies and avoid any solution ‘imposed by Europe’ (interview 2). The 
development of a formal governance framework enshrined into legislation is therefore, from 
the perspective of the Commission and European Parliament, only a second-best solution. It is 
a functionally driven move, motivated by the need to meet the EU’s climate commitment within 
the Paris framework, in the absence of binding national targets for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, and while respecting member states’ sovereignty concerns. 
 
The Governance Regulation heralds a bi-directional authority shifts in climate and energy 
governance (see Herranz Surralles et al 2020). On the one hand there is a downward shift 
towards a partial reclaiming of authority compared to the 2020 framework, at least concerning 
the definition and enforcement of national renewable energy objectives, with a reduced role for 
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the Court.11 At the same time, there is also an upward authority shift towards the EU level in 
terms of planning and compliance monitoring. NECPs are produced and implemented by 
member states under the Commission’s guidance, covering mainly climate and clean energy 
objectives, but also other aspects related to the internal market. This suggests that the changes 
do not conform to a strict pattern of re-nationalisation or disintegration. 
 
The Governance Regulation creates a process of ‘harder soft governance’ (Ringel and Knodt 
2018) – partially inspired by the European Semester system12  – to manage authority conflicts 
in energy policy, with formal adjudication restricted to certain aspects (see Herranz Surralles 
et al 2020). Yet, there is also a limited shift in authority to the Commission as an agent 
empowered to monitor and advise member states on national plans and strategies, including 
through the use of the indicative renewable energy formula. There is also a potential further 
shift to the Commission in terms of recommendations and additional measures in case of 
failure, if the change in the governance process, and greater self-governance, is in danger of 
failing to achieve binding EU targets. In the case where there is a delivery gap between headline 
goals set by the member states themselves and their implementation as part of the Governance 
Regulation, it is likely that substance-based contestation over the level of ambitions and best 
way to achieve them will become explicit, with conflicts emerging between leaders and 
laggards. In turn this is likely to reopen discussions and contestation on sovereignty delegation 
if the largely informal or softer authority conferred to supranational institutions in the 
Regulation has been insufficient to prevent non-compliance and free riding.  
 
 
11 In contrast, the climate targets defined in the Effort Sharing Regulation remain binding and potentially 
enforceable through court proceedings, while the headline energy efficiency target is still only indicative. 
12 As one interviewee explained, the Governance Regulation reflects the Council’s view that “the whole 
governance of the Climate should follow the model of the European Semester” (interview 15).  
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Unlike economic governance within the Semester, there will be no binding country specific 
recommendations from the Commission. The Commission has the power to use legal sanctions 
in the form of infringement procedures only for non-submission, delays or improper realisation 
of national plans and not for any lack of ambition within them or failure to comply with 
Commission recommendations. However, member states with an initial ambition gap, or later 
an implementation gap, will be under domestic and peer member state pressure to address this 
failure, with the Commission then using bottom-up rather than previous top-down pressure. 
Politicisation is therefore embedded in the governance, to compensate for the softer judicial 
pressure. As a national representative argued, the process is designed “…to bring politics into 
energy policy” (interview 14). Political contestation in implementation is expected to 
compensate for the relative depoliticisation of EU level target setting in decision-making.  
 
Secondly, the shadow of hard governance through the traditional Community method remains. 
This includes new legislative proposals to address collective EU failure. Arguably, member 
states are far from united and a blatant failure to keep on track towards EU objectives could 
lead to changing Council positions and the possibility of a shift of authority to supranational 
institutions accompanied by ‘harder’ legislation. A partial move away from supranational 
governance is made contingent on member states achieving the commitments (emissions, 
renewables and energy efficiency) they have made in the European Council and as part of the 
Paris Agreement. Oberthür (2019) concludes that on balance the 2030 governance framework 
is no less stringent than previously.  
 
The Energy Union governance framework as embedded intergovernmentalism 
Whilst most aspects of the clean energy package remain within the scope of the Community 
method, the process has been dominated by governments from the agenda setting phase to the 
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negotiations. As part of the European Council, member states set the framework and the 
headline goals within which the Commission has had to work, notably at the October 2014 
summit. Yet, a careful tracing of the negotiations process suggests that supranational 
institutions have not been merely reactive and have contributed to shape the process and 
outcome, aided by divisions and shifts among member states themselves.  
 
If the Commission refrained from directly challenging the Heads of State and Governments 
when drafting legislative proposals, as expected by NI, it also promoted a stronger role for 
itself in monitoring national plans and progress towards the EU objectives. As for the EP it 
successfully pushed for more ambitions (if not for more binding objectives), aided by a shift in 
the power balance in the Council in the last phase of the negotiations. The EP was also 
instrumental in strengthening the role of the Commission in monitoring progress and 
compliance. The compromise also reflects a balancing act in the Council, with some 
governments having concerns about free riding by less ambitious member states while others 
were worried by the potential discretion of the Commission in assessing national plans and 
objectives. 
 
Energy policy does not fit neatly into the framework of the new intergovernmentalism. Member 
states are indeed central, and their collective authority (and relations) key to explain policy 
outcomes. Yet, in line with critics of new intergovernmentalism, we see cooperation and 
conflict as shaped by the EU institutional environment. The distribution of authority is far from 
clearly demarcated and stable, with potential for both informal competence creep and 
renationalisation. The outcome of the Governance Regulation negotiations is a framework in 
which the governments remain in the driving seat when defining their national headline 
objectives and the policy instruments to achieve them but are embedded in a process of 
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monitoring and peer review in which the Commission has a key political role to play. It has 
authority to guide member state policy plans and facilitate compliance, with some discretion 
in how it applies the Regulation’s principles. In terms of institutional power balance, new 
intergovernmentalism places authority on the most sovereignty sensitive issues firmly with the 
Council and European Council, where member states are represented, and consensus achieved. 
In contrast, in areas where the Community method dominates, authority is distributed among 
legislative institutions and the involvement of the European Council limited and intermittent. 
The Governance Regulation does not map neatly on either the traditional Community method 
or new intergovernmentalism (see table 1). It is better characterised as a ‘hybrid’ at the 




Firstly, the Energy Union governance framework illustrates the challenge of addressing 
enduring sovereignty concerns of member states and providing them with a degree of autonomy 
regarding their policy choices, while ensuring that headline targets and objectives collectively 
agreed are met. There has been a high level of contestation, between member states and 
supranational institutions, but also among member states themselves, regarding the desirable 
pattern of authority distribution, resulting in a bi-directional authority shift. Upward delegation 
of authority was to a significant extent successfully resisted by the member states on 
sovereignty grounds, and there has been a partial renationalisation of (renewable) energy 
policy. Yet, this intergovernmental shift is only partial and embedded, as there has also been 
an upward authority shift in order to mitigate concerns regarding the efficacy of an increasingly 
bottom-up process. The Commission is empowered to monitor, publicise and guide member 
states’ policies. Ultimately, the Energy Union governance framework attempts to reconcile the 
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objectives of balancing sovereignty with solidarity and flexibility without free riding; the text 
of the regulation mentions in its preamble (para. 59) the need “to avoid the ‘free rider’ effect” 
as a motivation for a close monitoring of member states’ national renewable energy trajectory.  
Secondly, the regular process of monitoring, reporting and revising is intended to provide 
flexibility in terms of targets and policy setting in a rapidly changing technological and political 
environment. Rather than a 10-year plan working towards fixed targets for 2030, as was the 
case for the EU’s 2020 climate and energy framework, the Governance Regulation provides 
for multiple points for stocktaking and corrective action if members states are collectively 
under delivering. This iterative process also offers opportunities to react to potential 
technological and political changes – increasing public pressure, falling technology costs, the 
results of international climate negotiations – and integral to its design is facilitating a 
ratcheting up of climate ambition. 
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Table 1: Patterns of authority distribution in three models of governance  
 





















Political decisions set the 
framework and headline 
goals, within which 
legislation and non-
legislative acts are 
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Legislative decision-
making and legislation 
Role of supranational 
institutions 
Commission refrains 
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integration 
Supranational institutions 
can influence and shape 
national positions but 
ultimately rely on MS 
decisions  
Integrationist role for 
the Commission, EP and 
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Compliance mechanisms 
Ownership of the 
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Legal enforcement by 




Dominance of Council 
and EUCO 
Council and EUCO 
central but inserted in 
institutional framework 
Distributed through the 
‘institutional triangle’ 
 
Source: Based on Dehousse 2011; Bickerton et al. 2015; and authors’ elaboration. 
